classification of race in india

1.       http://dialogue.hubpages.com/hub/Classification-of-Indian-Race

• Herbert Hope Risley was a British ethnographer and entered the Indian Civil Service in 1873. In 1890, he attempted the racial classification of India and conducted the study on the basis of Anthropomorphic Technique
• report in 1915 in 'The Peoples of India'. Risley classified Indian population into seven racial types.
• Turko - Iranian Type
• broad head, medium nose
• fairly tall
• Plentiful hair on the face
• eyes are generally dark
• fair complexion
• Baluchistan Province.
• represented by Baluchis and Afghans.
• Indo - Aryan Type:
• long head
• long nose,
• Fair complexion and have dark coloured eyes
• live in the regions of Rajasthan, Patna, Punjab and the valley of Kashmir
• Scythio - Dravidian Type
• medium to broad head
• nose is medium
• Fair complexion.
• Scanty hair on the face and body.
• Stature is medium.
• larger heads, flatter faces, higher noses and shorter stature.
• Gujarat and Coorg regions.
• Aryo - Dravidian Type
• long heads with tendency towards medium
• Skin colour varies from light brown to dark
• Nose is medium but broad
• shorter and dark nose.
• Uttar-Pradesh, Rajputna, Bihar.
• inter-mixture of male Aryans and female Dravidians.
• broad head with tendency towards medium
• Mongolo - Dravidian or Bengali Type
• nose is medium.
• skin colour is dark.
• plentiful facial hair.
• Stature is medium and short sometimes.
• broad heads.
• Mongolian Type:
• broad head and nose varies from fine to broad
• Stature is short or below medium
• Oblique eyes showing epicanthic fold
• skin color is dark
• Scanty body with hair on the face
• in and around Assam Nepal and Burma.
• Dravidian Type
• short statured people.
• Long head and Nose is broad
• depression seen at the root of nose
• Skin colour is very dark and dark coloured eyes
• true aborigines of India
• Hair is dark in colour and tends to curl.
• from ceylon to ganges covering whole south-eastern India

Lokpal and CBI

·         The magnitude of corruption in the Central government departments is mind-boggling,

·         we first need an effective anti-graft machinery at the Centre, rather than in the States

·         ushering in of a Lokpal should in no way dilute the CBI's legal authority or its operational effectiveness.

·         CBi was made ineffective withthe insertion of Section 6A in the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, making it mandatory for the CBI to get prior government permission before it can even proceed with a preliminary enquiry (PE) against an official of and above the rank of Joint Secretary in 2003

·         it amounted to deliberate emasculation of an organisation that requires teeth to tackle public servant corruption.

·         Following the Vineet Narain judgment (1997) by the Supreme Court, the superintendence of the CBI's anti-corruption work is with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).

·         we have had some non-interfering and mature Central Vigilance Commissioners, and an equally responsible and self-effacing CBI leadership.

·         most sensible thing to do would be to transfer the existing authority of superintendence of the CBI from the CVC to the Lokpal

Cautious approach to new banks

• Before 1969, many leading banks were owned or controlled by leading business groups
• In a two-stage process that began in 1969, the government nationalised these banks
• case for the takeover was built on the ground that these banks were serving their private promoters' interests
• Rbis latest proposal suggests that Entities/groups in the private sector, owned and controlled by residents, with diversified ownership, sound credentials and integrity and having successful track record of at least ten years will be eligible to promote banks.
• Eligible promoters
1. barred groups having even an exposure of 10 per cent (by way of assets or income or both) in real estate and/or broking activities over the past three years.
• Corporate structure
1. a wholly-owned non-operative holding company (NOHC), which will be registered with the RBI as a non-banking finance company
2. Idea is to ring fence the financial interests of the group from its other business activities
• minimum capital requirement will be Rs.500 crore
1. NOHC will hold a minimum 40 per cent of the capital for five years from the date of licensing.
2. aggregate non-resident shareholding will not exceed 49 per cent for the first five years.
• At least 50 per cent of the directors of the NOHC should be independent directors.

5 steps to tackle corruption

• What we need is some action — concrete, tangible action — which will create a sound framework for drastically reducing corruption in governance.
• first step is the creation of a set of laws.
1. enacting the law is no panacea. But that is where we begin.

STEPS to be taken

• 1. implement Benami Transaction act
• 2. act on Corrupt Public Servants
• 3. Whistle-Blower Protection act
• 4. amend Representation of the People Act by declaring that any candidate who has been convicted in a court of law even for less than two years or against whom criminal charges have been framed in a court cannot contest elections till he is fully cleared and acquitted.
1. presence of criminals in parliament goed directly against the principle of the “integrity of the institution” of Parliament/Legislature as a lawmaking body for good governance.
2. this will in one stroke ensure that criminalisation of politics is effectively checked.
• 5. in cases of corruption there will be a six-month limit for conducting the original case at the end of which a decision must be given. There will be only one appeal allowed and the appellate court also must decide the case in six months. This will drastically cut down delay in corruption cases.

should industrial houses get banking licenses?

• Arguments against giving licence to industrial/business houses:
1. connected lending
2. opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
3. exacerbate the concentration of economic power and political influence
4. existing players also could raise the required capital and, as such, no additional benefit accrues by granting bank licences to industrial houses.
• Arguments in favour of giving licence to industrial/business houses:
1. Financial inclusion requires higher scale of operations which the industries would be able to bring
2. their talent could be gainfully harnessed in the banking sector.
3. industrial houses could bring to banking strong governance practices, management expertise, talent, innovation and global best practices especially in customer service,
• Safeguards for allowing industrial/business houses to promote new banks:
1. they should not be allowed to have their own banking operations through the bank they have promoted.
2. should be issued only a retail banking license for first 5 years. Subsequently, commercial banking should be allowed with restrictions
3.  strong regulation relating to connected lending, mutual lending to each other’s sponsor groups, ring fencing of the activities,

Dismal progress in social housing

• The Interest Subsidy Scheme for Housing the Urban Poor (ISHUP), launched in 2008 to provide an interest subsidy of five per cent on a loan amount of Rs.100,000 to the economically weaker section and lower income group, has so far benefited only 7,805 people as against the 2012 target of 310,000.
• Progress on the flagship project, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, which has a provision of Rs.50,000 crore for the period 2005-2012, is no better. Only about 30 per cent of houses sanctioned for the poor under this scheme have been built.

Problems

• poor conceptualisation of policies,
• procedural inefficiency,
• ineffective construction practices

EXAMPLES

• ISHUP has failed to deliver because it is conceptually flawed.
•  Policymakers assumed that the poor had access to land and needed only financial support to build their houses.
• As a result, the focus was on making credit easily available
• But reality is both land and capital are not available with urban poor

WAY AHEAD

• If the demand for social housing is to be met, in addition to rectifying policies, construction practices and performance regimes need to be greatly improved
• State-level housing boards must improve their capacity in order to fully utilise the available funds and deliver more houses.

UK EXPERIENCE

• They formed productive alliances with the construction industry and adopted modern methods that increased the production of homes four-fold
• It is only by adopting such innovative practices and radically changing the approach to the provision of social housing can the vision of making cities slum-free be realised